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CHAPTER 18 
State and Municipal Government 
FRED WINSLOW FISHER 
A. COURT DECISIONS: STATE GOVERNMENT 
§18.1. State Contributory Retirement Appeal Board: Accidental 
disability and death benefits and allowances. The state Contributory 
Retirement Appeal Board, created by G.L., c. 32, §16(4), continues to 
blaze a legal trail in a somewhat obscure but an increasingly important 
branch of the law, moneywise at least. In 1945, in answer to a persist-
ent demand, the various public retirement systems were, to a degree, 
harmonized by the General Court.! Among these were provisions as-
suring teachers of substantially equal acid ental disability and death 
benefits to those received by other public employees. Today we have 
in this state fundamentally sound and uniform contributory retirement 
systems for our public employees providing substantial superannua-
tion, ordinary and accidental disability retirement allowances, and 
death benefits, toward which they contribute about 5 percent of their 
compensation. The public treasuries contribute the balance. Com-
ments are sometimes made relative to the accidental disability re-
tirement allowances. Generally speaking, under G.L., c. 32, §7, these 
amount to about two thirds of the annual compensation of the 
employee with added allowances for minor dependents. In cases 
of accidental death, the benefits are paid to the widow. On the whole 
it is generally accepted that the systems serve a vital purpose. Re-
cently, however, several cases have been before the Supreme Judicial 
Court to determine whether the injury or death arose out of and while 
in the course of employment. In BarufJaldi v. Contributory Retire-
ment Appeal Board,2 it was held that the death of a public employee 
already afflicted with a diseased heart, by the impact upon it of the 
excitement arising from an altercation with a contractor in the course 
of his employment, entitled his widow to accidental death benefits 
under G.L., c. 32, §9. In other words, it might seem that the insertion 
FRED w. FISHER is First Assistant Attorney General of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of David H. Kravetz, of the 
Board of Student Editors, in the research and writing of this chapter. 
§18.l. 1 Acts of 1945, c. 658, effective January I, 1946. 
2337 Mass. 495, 150 N.E.2d 269 (1958), noted in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§13.3, 
19.9. 
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of the words "personal injury" in Sections 7 and 9 of Chapter 32 by the 
provisions of Acts of 1945, c. 658, has brought claims for accidental 
injury and death under the retirement laws into the same category as 
claims for workmen's compensation under the provisions of Chapter 
152 of the General Laws. In view of the background of the two sys-
tems, their widely divergent provisions, and the benefits provided in 
each, an interesting source of speculation is provided. 
§18.2. Accidental disability retirement: Effect of medical panel re-
port. Another aspect of accidental retirement allowances under G.L., 
c. 32, was discussed and decided in the case of Kelley v. Contributory 
Appeal Board.1 Sections 6 and 7 of Chapter 32 provide that before an 
application for an accidental disability retirement allowance may 
be granted, a medical panel must be set up as therein provided and, 
after examining the applicant, must prepare and file with the retire-
ment board a certificate of its findings as to the nature of the injury, 
its permanency, and whether it was or might be service connected. It 
was held in Hunt v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board 2 that 
a favorable medical panel report was a condition precedent to the 
allowance of an application for an accidental disability retirement 
allowance. In the Kelly case the medical panel certified: "We are of 
opinion that the disability noted above is not the natural and prox-
imate result of the accident or hazard undergone on account of which 
retirement is claimed." The Boston Retirement Board on the basis of 
the report of the medical panel denied the application, and the state 
board allowed a motion to dismiss the appeal for the same reason. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, upon a petition for review under the 
state Administrative Procedure Act,S ordered that the appeal board 
remand the case to the Boston Retirement Board for further pro-
ceedings in accordance with the opinion, saying, "The two sections, 
6 and 7, read together require, for affirmative board action, a certificate 
of the incapacity and that it might be service connected." 4 The Court 
also discussed the power of the appeal board to order retirement if 
there is a negative medical certificate in proper form, saying: 
. . . we think there is no right to or power of review of the 
finding of the medical panel if the certificate does not disclose, or 
there is no claim of, error of law. The statute prescribes no appeal 
from the panel determination. . .. It follows that the appeal 
board may not affirm the decision of the local board on a negative 
certificate without giving the applicant an opportunity to show 
such wrong or illegal action, but that the applicant does not have 
an opportunity for a retrial of the medical facts, where there has 
been a determination of them by the panel, applying proper pro-
cedures and correct principles of law.5 
§18.2. 1341 Mass. 611, 171 N.E.2d 277 (1961). 
2332 Mass. 625, 127 N.E.2d 171 (1955). 
3 G.L., c. 30A, §14. 
4341 Mass. 611, 614, 171 N.E.2d 277, 279 (1961). 
5341 Mass. at 617,171 N.E.2d at 280. 
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§18.3. Accidental death benefits: State Contributory Retirement 
Appeal Board and Administrative Procedure Act. In the case of 
McCarthy v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board,1 the Supreme 
Judicial Court ruled on conflicting evidence, in a petition for review 
under the Administrative Procedure Act, that the petitioner, the 
widow of a state representative who collapsed while engaged in a 
debate in the House and died some years later, was not entitled to 
accidental death benefits under Section 9 of Chapter 32, and affirmed 
the decision of the State Board of Retirement denying her application 
for accidental death benefits. The Court said: "Whether McCarthy's 
death was within the terms of Section 9(1) was a question to be decided 
by the appeal board. If its decision rested on substantial evidence-
and we hold that it did - the judge had no power to set it aside." 2 
Another interesting case covering, in general, the same subject 
matter may be found reported in the case of State Board of Retirement 
v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board.3 The Court held, upon 
conflicting evidence, that a finding of the Superior Court that death 
was the natural and proximate result of a personal injury sustained 
in the course of employment under the provisions of G.L., c. 32, §9, was 
unsupported by substantial evidence. The Court further held that 
the State Board of Retirement was an aggrieved party under the provi-
sions of the state Administrative Procedure Act. 
§18.4. Contributory retirement law: Superannuation allowance: 
"Moral turpitude." An interesting decision was rendered by the Su-
preme Judicial Court in Essex County Retirement Board v. Contribu-
tory Retirement Appeal Board.1 It was held that the conviction for a 
criminal offense under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence 
constituted a removal by operation of law for "moral turpitude," 
depriving the intervenor of the right to a superannuation retirement 
allowance.2 
§18.5. State Board of Public Welfare: Appeal by municipality from 
order increasing recipient'S old-age assistance allowance. In Town of 
Natick v. Department of Public Welfare,1 it was held that the respond-
ent properly ordered the petitioner to increase the old-age assistance 
allotment to one of its recipients. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled 
that the petitioner municipality was a proper party to petition for a 
review of the action of the respondent under the provisions of the state 
Administrative Procedure Act.2 It was further held that there was 
no basis for the petitioner'S contention that, under the act, its sub-
stantial rights had been prejudiced because the agency decision was 
§18.3. 1342 Mass. 45,172 N.E.2d 120 (1961). 
2342 Mass. at 49,172 N.E.2d at 123. 
3342 Mass. 58,172 N.E.2d 234 (1961). 
§18.4. 1342 Mass. 322,173 N.E.2d 627 (1961). 
2 G.L., c. 32, §IO(I). 
§18.5. 1341 Mass. 618,171 N.E.2d 273 (1961). 
2 G.L., c. 30A, §14. 
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unsupported by substantial evidence.3 On the evidence the Court 
stated that the petitioner's contention that the evidence required the 
use of the room-and-board basis set out in the respondent's standards, 
rather than the household expense plan, was not established. 
§18.6. Boston Redevelopment Authority: Administrative matter: 
Status of executive director after legislative consolidation. Simonian 
v. Boston Redevelopment Authorityl involved a rather unusual situa-
tion concerning the internal organization of the Boston Redevelopment 
Authority. The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to restore him 
to the position of executive director of the authority as it existed 
under its earlier votes and to exclude another from acting in that office 
under later votes. The petition was dismissed. The authority was 
organized under G.L., c. 121, §26QQ. Under that section read with 
Section 26N, it was authorized to employ an executive director and 
other agents and employees and determine their duties. On October 27, 
1957, the authority voted the executive director's duties in detail, and 
on December 11, his salary was fixed at $12,000. Under Chapter 299 
of the Acts of 1958, amending Section 26QQ, no non-civil-service 
permanent employee could, after six months, be discharged, removed, 
or lowered in rank or compensation except for just cause and in ac-
cordance with Sections 43 and 45 of Chapter 31 of the General Laws. 
Section 12 of Chapter 652 of the Acts of 1960 transferred to the author-
ity the powers of the State Housing Board under G.L., c. 121A, over 
Boston projects and established the authority as a planning board 
under G.L., c. 4, §70, with all the duties of the city planning board in 
Boston, and transferred its employees without loss of status, including 
the planning administrator, planning director, and others. A con-
solidation took place, and the duties of the executive director were 
somewhat changed. It was held that tenure statutes such as Chapter 
299 relate primarily to pay, title, and formal rank and that substantial 
changes in duties may be made in due course without affecting such 
status; that there may be greater scope for such changes in high 
executive posts than in lower ones. In any event Acts of 1960, c. 652, 
expanded the statutory mandate of the authority and justified internal 
reorganization and reallocation of duties of employees, particularly 
those in key positions. The protection of a tenure statute must yield 
to the legislative intent. The reorganization and the change of 
petitioner'S duties were reasonable adjustments. It was further stated 
that in important aspects the petitioner's employment status was unim-
paired. His pay was increased. Moreover the petitioner retained all 
the attributes of his post that were consistent with the decision to 
make the change in top command. 
§18.7. State Racing Commission: Licenses. A petition for review of 
two decisions of the State Racing Commission was brought by Bay State 
3Id. §14(8). 
§18.6. 1342 Mass. 57!!, 174 N.E.2d 429 (1961). 
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Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Association.1 One decision 
granted a license to the petitioner to conduct parimutuel harness 
racing for 57 days in 1961, and the other granted a similar license 
to the Eastern Racing Association for 33 days. General Laws, c. 128A, 
§3, provides that licenses may not be issued for more than an aggregate 
of 90 days in one year. The petitioner alleged that it had expended 
large sums of money in acquiring its track and facilities and otherwise 
in promoting harness horse racing for a period of over ten years and 
that, in spite of these facts, the respondent had arbitrarily and capri-
ciously reduced its number of licensed racing days. The petition 
prayed that the Eastern license be set aside and that the commission 
reconsider Bay State's application for ten additional days. An inter-
locutory decree sustaining the commission's demurrer and a final 
decree dismissing the petition were reversed by the Supreme Judicial 
Court and the case was remanded. While the commission has broad 
discretion in the performance of its duties, it must conform to general 
standards of public interest, convenience, and necessity concerning 
both the persons by whom and the manner in which the tracks are 
conducted, including the parimutuel gambling, and the interests of 
members of the public in racing competition honestly managed and 
of good quality. 
Judicial review may be obtained under the Administrative Procedure 
Act by any person aggrieved by a final decision of an "agency" in an 
"adjudicatory proceeding." The commission is such an agency, 
and the application for a racing license is an "adjudicatory proceed-
ing." Consequently the proceedings before the commission relative 
to the application for a license must be conducted under Sections 10 
and II of G.L., c. 30A. The provisions of Chapters 30A and 128A 
of the General Laws require subsidiary findings of fact to support 
the decision of the commission. Bay State was aggrieved by the 
denial of its request for a license for the extra ten days it sought; it was 
further aggrieved by the grant to Eastern. The circumstances require 
a fair comparative consideration of both applications. Bay State was 
entitled to have findings of fact upon all material issues of fact. 
§18.8. Proceedings against the Commonwealth: Title to land. In 
Executive Air Service} Inc. v. Division of Fisheries and Game? two 
cases were brought against the division, the Commonwealth, and the 
Coonamessett Ranch Company. In the first case the plaintiff brought 
a bill in equity for a declaratory decree, under G.L., c. 231A, and in 
the second sought relief by a petition under G.L., c. 258, relating to 
claims against the Commonwealth. Demurrers to both cases had been 
sustained below. 
The plaintiff for many years has operated an airport in the town of 
Falmouth. The airport is located on about eighty acres of land leased 
§18.7. 1 Bay Sta,te Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Assn. v. State Racing Com-
mission, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 951,175 N.E.2d 244. 
§18.8. 1342 Mass. 356, 173 N.E.2d 614 (1961). 
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to the plaintiff by the defendant ranch company. The Division of 
Fisheries and Game acquired by purchase from the ranch company 
two parcels of land at Falmouth containing about 1400 acres, which 
included land covered by the plaintiff's lease. In the deeds, which are 
subject to the plaintiff's lease, the Commonwealth is the grantee. The 
land is registered, and certificates of title have been issued by the Land 
Court. General Laws, c. 131, §25, provides that property cannot be 
acquired "without the approval of the selectmen," and this approval 
was not obtained. The division has assumed control of the 1400 acres 
and has ordered the plaintiff to terminate its activities at the airport. 
One of the prayers is for a binding declaration as to the validity of the 
deeds and of the certificates of title. There were two demurrers to 
the bill, one by the Commonwealth and the division, and one by the 
ranch company. One common ground of the demurrers was that 
proceedings under G.L., c. 231A, will not lie against the Common-
wealth. The Supreme Judicial Court held that this ground of the 
demurrer was good. The enactment of the declaratory judgment 
procedure did not constitute consent by the Commonwealth to become 
a defendant in this type of suit. Under our system of jurisprudence, 
the Commonwealth cannot be impleaded in its own courts except 
with its consent, and when that consent is granted, it can be impleaded 
only in the manner and to the extent expressed in the statute. The 
Court stated that in other states it is generally held that sovereign 
immunity is not affected by declaratory judgment procedure. A 
similar view prevails in the federal courts.2 Since the case involves 
the Commonwealth's title in real estate, it is the real party in interest, 
and the case cannot proceed without it. 
The petition in the second case contained substantially the same 
allegations as did the bill in the first case. There were prayers for 
injunctive relief against the Commonwealth and the division and for 
damages. One of the grounds for demurrer was that a petition under 
G.L., c. 258, may be brought for damages but not to try title to land or 
restrain the Commonwealth. The Court stated that the object of 
Chapter 258 was not to create a new class of claims for which the 
Commonwealth had never before been held responsible, but to provide 
a convenient tribunal for the hearing of claims of the character that 
civilized governments had always recognized although the satisfaction 
of them has usually been sought by direct appeal through the legisla-
ture. There is no jurisdiction under Chapter 258 to issue an injunc-
tion against the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth has not 
consented to any procedure to adjudicate its title to this real estate. 
§18.9. Lord's Day Statute: "Shop and business." In Common-
wealth v. Chamberlain,1 the defendants were charged in separate 
2 Developments in the Law - Declaratory Judgments -1941-1949, 62 Harv. L. 
Rev. 787, 821-825 (1949). 
§18.9. 11961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1091, 175 N.E.2d 486. The opinion also decided the 
companion case of Commonwealth v. Martenson. 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1961 [1961], Art. 21
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1961/iss1/21
§18.10 STATE AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 207 
complaints with keeping their shops open on the Lord's day for the 
purpose of doing business or work in violation of G.L., c. 136, §5, 
which stems, as may be generally known at the bar, from legislation 
passed over two and one-half centuries ago. Section 5 in its present 
form reads as follows: 
Whoever on the Lord's day keeps open his shop, warehouse or 
workhouse, or does any manner of labor, business or work, except 
works of necessity and charity, shall be punished by a fine of not 
more than fifty dollars. 
Waiving a jury the defendants were tried upon an agreed statement 
of facts, found guilty, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 
The defendants were owners and operators of coin-operated laun-
dries and provided washing and drying machines. Neither defendant 
was present at his laundry on the date charged in the complaint. The 
patrons, upon placing coins in coin-operated machines, performed 
the labor necessary for their requirements. The Court held that the 
place of business of each defendant was a "shop" under the statute; a 
sale is not required for violation of the statute. The constitutionality 
of Section 5 had been upheld in Commonwealth v. Chernock.2 Section 
5 violates the provisions of neither the state nor the federal Constitu-
tions. The decision agrees with Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super 
Market of Mass., Inc.3 
§18.10. Housing authority: Scope of authority. Costonis v. Med-
ford Housing Authorityl is interesting because it clarifies the scope of 
authority of an agent of a housing authority created under G.L., c. 121, 
§26K. The case was an action of contract or tort to recover a balance 
under a painting contract and a sum of money for extras. The Su-
preme Judicial Court held that the executive director of the defendant 
had authority to modify the written contract. Ordinarily a written 
contract, before breach, may be varied by a subsequent parol agreement 
upon sufficient consideration, this rule applying both to sealed instru-
ments and simple contracts.2 A housing authority has the contracting 
powers of a private corporation, and an agent in charge of its transac-
tions has broad authority. The general and special findings of a trial 
justice will stand if warranted in law upon any possible view of the 
evidence. The findings of the trial justice that the executive director 
had apparent authority to waive the provisions of the written contract 
and to order extra work were justified. 
2336 Mass. 384, 386, 145 N.E.2d 920, 922 (1958). 
3366 U.S. 617, 81 Sup. Ct. 1122,6 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1961). 
§18.1O. 1 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1153, 176 N.E.2d 25. 
2The Court followed Zlotnick v. McNamara, 301 Mass. 224, 225, 226, 16 N.E.2d 
632, 633 (1938), in so holding. 
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B. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: COURT DECISIONS 
§18.11. Bailment: Adverse possession. Town of Warren v. BallI 
was an action of replevin for two ancient pieces of fire apparatus 
known as hand tubs. The jury found for the plaintiff, and the de-
fendant's exceptions were overruled. There was conflicting evidence 
for the consideration of the jury concerning the circumstances under 
which the hand tubs were delivered to the defendant's testator. The 
jury could have found that the tubs were left in his care and safe-
keeping. The defendant argued in support of a motion for a directed 
verdict that there was no evidence of a bailment of the tubs and that, 
even if there was, the demand for their return must be made within 
a reasonable time, and that a demand, as in this case, IIi years later 
was not within a reasonable time. The Supreme Judicial Court stated 
that the true principle is that the time when the demand must be made 
depends on the construction to be put upon the contract in each case. 
The demand must be made within a reasonable time, but what is a 
reasonable time is a question of law to be determined in reference 
to the nature of the contract and the probable intention of the parties 
as indicated by it. When there is nothing to indicate an expectation 
that a demand is to be made quickly or that there was to be a delay in 
making it, the prescriptive period for bringing such an action after 
the cause of action accrues should ordinarily be treated as the time 
within which a demand must be made. It could have been found 
that the transaction between the parties, being a bailment, was to 
continue into the future for a substantial period of time before the 
plaintiff would be expected to demand the return of the tubs. The 
bailor or beneficiary would not ordinarily take steps to assert his rights 
until there had been a repudiation by the bailee or trustee. While 
the evidence established that the testator's possession for the statutory 
period was open and continuous, it fell far short of establishing as a 
matter of law that such possession was hostile to the town and hence 
adverse. Until the plaintiff's demand was refused in October, 1957, 
Ball's possession could have been found to be consistent with a bail-
ment. 
§18.12. Taxpayer's suit: Necessity of municipal expenditure. 
North v. City Council of Brockton1 was a taxpayer's suit under G.L., 
c. 40, §53, brought against the city council, the city manager, and the 
chief engineer of the fire department. Its purpose was to enjoin 
the expenditure of money or the incurring of obligations under an 
ordinance reducing the work week of the members of the fire depart-
ment from fifty-six to forty-eight hours. The Supreme Judicial Court 
ordered a new interlocutory decree to be entered sustaining the 
demurrer and a new final decree dismissing the petition. The Cour~ 
§18.I1. 1341 Mass. 350, 170 N.E.2d 341 (1960). 
§18.12. 1341 Mass. 483,170 N.E.2d 470 (1960). 
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stated that a taxpayer's petition under G.L., c. 40, §53, cannot be 
brought to challenge an ordinance passed by the city council unless 
some illegal expenditures are contemplated by the passing of the 
ordinance. Massachusetts cases have emphasized the basic provision 
that the town or its officers must be about to raise or expend money 
or incur obligations. The petition did not contain any such allega-
tions. The nearest approach is found in allegations upon information 
and belief that, if the forty-eight-hour work week becomes effective, in 
order to give the city adequate fire protection it will be necessary to 
appoint additional fire fighters at an increased payroll cost of $115,000 
and that there will be other great additional costs. 
§I8.I3. Mandamus: Discretionary .act. Denunzio v. City Manager 
of Cambridge1 involved a petition for a writ of mandamus alleging 
that the city council of Cambridge had passed an order granting an 
increase in the retirement allowance of the petitioner in accordance 
with the provisions of G.L., c. 32, §90A, but that the city manager at all 
times had refused to approve the order. Section 90A provides among 
other things that a city which accepts it by two-thirds vote of the city 
council and with the approval of the mayor may increase the retire-
ment allowance of any former employee who had been retired on 
account of injuries sustained or hazard undergone in the performance 
of his duties. The briefs are premised on the showing of the petition 
and answer that the city manager2 had not given the approval which 
Section 90A specifies. In dismissing the petition the Supreme Judicial 
Court stated that there is nothing to suggest that the statute providing 
for approval was specifying only a ministerial act for the mayor or the 
city manager, as the case may be. It is basic in our system that much 
legislation is effective only upon the approval of the executive_ This 
is the requirement of Section 90A. Mandamus does not lie to compel 
the city manager to exercise his judgment or discretion in a particular 
way. 
§I8.14. City land: Transfer from one department to another. The 
case of Bouchard v. City of Haverhil[1 was a taxpayer's bill under G.L., 
c. 40, §53. From an interlocutory decree sustaining a demurrer and a 
final decree dismissing the bill, the petitioner appealed. Both decrees 
were affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
In 1955 the city acquired land by eminent domain for a new school 
building. The school committee approved the site and the building is 
nearing completion. In 1959 the city manager determined that a 
portion of the land was not needed for school purposes and so advised 
the city council. The city council thereupon transferred it to the fire 
department on condition that no engine house built upon it should 
contain a workshop. About a month later the school committee, 
§18.l3. 1341 Mass. 420, 169 N.E.2d 877 (1960). 
2 The city manager acted under C.L., c. 43, §104, in place of the mayor, who is 
the designated approving authority under C.L., c. 32, §90A. 
§18.l4. 1342 Mass. I, 171 N.E.2d 848 (1961). 
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having determined that the portion of the school land was no longer 
needed for school purposes, relinquished it to the city council in 
conformity with G.L., c. 40, §15A. The petition alleged that the 
determination of the manager, the orders of the council, and the vote 
of the school committee were invalid and that the city was about to 
raise and expend money for the fire station. The Court held that the 
vote of the council was valid although not specifying the purpose 
for which the land was transferred, since it was admitted that the city 
was about to erect a fire station on the land, which was a public 
purpose. The vote could be amended. Further, the vote of the 
council, although preceding that of the school committee, could 
remain ambulatory until action by the school committee. 
§18.15. Adverse possession: Municipal corporations. The peti-
tioner in the action of Cerel v. Town of Framingham1 sought to 
register his title to certain real estate, a portion of which was claimed 
by the town. In the Land Court a decision was entered for the peti-
tioner "free from any rights of the respondent." The Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed. The lower court found that in 1888 the 
town took certain land in Natick by virtue of Acts of 1887, c. 403, and 
constructed filter beds, some of which were outside of the land taken 
and inside the locus in dispute. Until 1936 the locus was substantially 
covered by two filter beds cared for by the town sewer department. 
The only use was for the filter beds. Several times land was taken 
from the property for highway purposes. In 1936 the use of the locus 
for filter beds was abandoned. In 1950 the town selectmen by lease 
allowed a third party to maintain a sign upon the property. 
The locus was excluded from the land acquired under Acts of 1887, 
c.403. The trial judge found that from 1889 to 1936 the town did not 
formally take the locus by adverse possession nor authorize its em-
ployees to do so, nor ratify any action of the employees in doing so. A 
town may acquire title to real property by adverse possession within its 
limits. The Supreme Judicial Court assumed in its opinion that land 
might be so acquired outside its limits. The disseisin, however, must 
be the corporate action of the town. The town employees had no 
authority in themselves to build or maintain the sewerage beds in the 
locus, and the town failed to show corporate action. 
§18.16. Local option statute: Acceptance. The case of Oleksak v. 
City of Westfield1 brought to light a rule of law sometimes overlooked 
in the administration of municipal business. This was a suit in equity 
brought by members of the police department of the defendant against 
the city, the chief of police, the city auditor, and the city treasurer 
for a declaratory judgment to determine whether the city had properly 
accepted Section 108E of G.L., c. 41, providing among other things for 
minimum annual compensation of regular police officers in accepting 
municipalities. Section 108E provides: 
§18.l5. 1342 Mass. 17. 171 N.E.2d 840 (1961). 
§18.l6. 1342 Mass. 50. 172 N.E.2d 85 (1961). 
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Notwithstanding the provisions of any general or special law to 
the contrary, the minimum annual compensation of each regular 
police officer of the police department of any city or town shall be 
not less than the following: . .. This section shall become effec-
tive when accepted in a city having a plan E charter by the affirma-
tive vote of a majority of all the members of the city council, 
and, in the case of other cities, by vote of the city council, subject 
to the provisions of the charter .... 
Westfield is incorporated under Acts of 1920, c. 294, as amended, and 
does not have a plan E charter. The city council has eleven members. 
On December 3, 1959, when ten were present, it was unanimously 
voted to accept C.L., c. 41, §108E. Later on sums were appropriated 
to make Section 108E effective. Both votes of the council were 
approved by the mayor. It was contended by the defendants that the 
vote of December 3 violated Sections 28, 29, 30, and 31 of the city 
charter, all relating to city ordinances. In ordering a decree declaring 
that Section lO8E had been validly accepted by the city, the Supreme 
Judicial Court pointed out the difference between a local ordinance 
and the acceptance of a local option statute of general import, the 
former being subject to amendment or repeal and the latter being 
beyond the power of the council to rescind without express statutory 
authorization. Provisions in the charter governing ordinances did not 
apply to the acceptance of local option statutes. 
§18.17. Retirement: Veteran. The case of Weiner v. City of Bos-
ton1 disclosed an unusual situation. It was an action in contract to 
recover instalments of a pension claimed to be due under an alleged 
retirement in accordance with C.L., c. 32, §58, as amended. In 1917 
the plaintiff enlisted in the Medical Department Enlisted Reserve 
Corps. He passed the physical examination, was sworn in and assigned 
a service number. He continued his studies at Harvard Medical 
School. He engaged in daily drill under the supervision of army 
training officers. The plaintiff was never called into active service 
and was honorably discharged. The plaintiff was recognized as a 
veteran by the civil service division under C.L., c. 31, §23, when his 
name was placed on the civil service eligible list from which he was 
employed by the defendant in 1925. The plaintiff's application for 
retirement was approved. The defendant's ordinances require the 
city auditor to sign a draft to pay a retirement allowance, and the 
auditor has not signed such a draft. No retirement allowance has 
been paid. The Supreme Judicial Court held that an action in con-
tract was a proper method to determine the validity of the plaintiff's 
claim. Action of the Civil Service Commission and the city did not 
estop the city from denying that plaintiff was not a "veteran" under 
C.L., c. 32, §58. Moreover, the plaintiff was not a "veteran" within 
the provisions of C.L., c. 31, §23, because he had not "served in the 
army ... " 
§18.l7. 1342 Mass. 67,172 N.E.2d 96 (1961). 
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§18.18. Public officer: Municipal corporations. Commonwealth v. 
OliverI provides more light in determining the status of certain public 
officers and their responsibilities. This was a report of the questions 
of law arising on motions of three members of the Municipal Light 
Commission of Taunton and the manager of the plant to quash 
indictments under C.L., c. 266, §51; c. 268, §9; and c. 149, §§44A-44L. 
The Supreme Judicial Court stated that each of the defendants was an 
officer of the city of Taunton within the purview of C.L., c. 266, §51; 
the manager, although acting under the direction and control of com-
missioners, is nevertheless an officer of the city within the scope of 
C.L., c. 268, §9. The Court held invalid, however, the indictments 
that charged the awarding of a contract "for the alteration, remodeling 
and repair of a public building in the amount of $18,324 ... with-
out competitive bids in accordance with the procedure set forth 
in . . . c. 149, s. 44A to 44L, inclusive." Despite the provisions of 
C.L., c. 149, §180, providing that whoever violates a provision of the 
chapter for which no specific penalty is provided shall be punished 
by a fine of not more than $100, this provision does not apply to 
Sections 44A to 44L. Failure to follow the technical requirements of 
bidding is not the type of act that is criminal in nature, particularly 
since the sections are not precise and definite in many aspects. Merely 
because one act may be clearly required does not permit application 
of criminal sanctions for failure to comply. 
§18.19. Schools: Acceptance of referendum by committee. Murphy 
v. City of Cambridge l is an appeal by the plaintiffs from final decrees 
in the Superior Court dismissing two bills that were brought by pro-
fessional employees in the school department of Cambridge against 
the city and the school committee. The school committee voted 
to establish new positions; the plaintiffs, among others, were ap-
pointed; and a budget was adopted for 1957, which included salaries 
for those appointed. A referendum vote was taken which was ad-
verse to the action of the committee. Accordingly, the committee 
voted to "honor the mandate of the voters" and struck from its budget 
the monies that had been inserted to cover the new positions. The 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the plaintiffs had only expectancies 
but neither contracts nor tenure. The decision of the committee 
after the referendum has been recorded, and the department is thus 
to be operated without the new positions to which the plaintiffs had 
been appointed. 
§18.20. Civil service: Classification. In Crowley v. City of Boston l 
it appeared that in June, 1952, a classification plan and compensation 
plan were formulated by the director of civil service for certain civil 
service positions in Boston under C.L., c. 31, §2A(b). It classified 
§18.l8. 1342 Mass. 82,172 N.E.2d 241 (1961). 
§18.l9. 1342 Mass. 339, 173 N.E.2d 616 (1961). The opinion also decided a 
companion case with the same name. 
§18.20. 1342 Mass. 344,173 N.E.2d 647 (1961). 
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the plaintiff as a senior clerk. He was then a civil service employee 
in the traffic department under the title "clerk" and was paid weekly. 
His service in that position began on January 14, 1952. The plan 
provided for a right to seek from the director a review of the classifica-
tion, and an appeal from his decision to the commission. A rule 
provides that the commission may decline to entertain an appeal from 
the decision of the director more than thirty days after notice. How-
ever, on July 27, 1955, after a hearing the commission voted to accept 
the plaintiff's late appeal from an adverse decision of the director and 
granted to him the allocation of senior traffic investigator. The 
present action was brought to recover the difference between what 
the plaintiff was entitled to under the new allocation and what he was 
actually paid. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the plaintiff 
was entitled to recover the balance from the time of the lower alloca-
tion in 1952, but recovery would not include increment increases 
because no written recommendation to that effect was given to the 
mayor as required by subrule (f). The plaintiff was entitled to interest 
only from the date of the writ. 
§18.21. Municipal contract: Validity. An exception to the action 
of the judge who, on motion, ordered a verdict for the defendant 
after the opening statement of the plaintiff's counsel brought the case 
of Singarella v. City of Bostonl before the Supreme Judicial Court. 
The plaintiff was the low bidder for the construction of a sewage dis-
posal system on Long Island, Boston. The contract was awarded. 
Contracts with the city over a certain amount must be in writing and 
the mayor must affix his signature of approval thereto. Contract 
forms were sent to the mayor with a letter stating that the plaintiff was 
the lowest bidder. The mayor fully understood the contract. He 
signed on the bottom of the letter, "approved J. B. Hynes, Mayor of 
Boston, Mass. 8/20/58." The letter was at all times stapled to the 
contract form. Subsequent to the mayor's approval, the plaintiff 
and the hospital trustees executed the contracts, and the city auditor 
also signed the contract. The plaintiff started work but was stopped 
by the city. 
For the purpose of determining the propriety of the judge's ruling, 
all the statements in the opening must be taken as true. The opening 
would support an ordinary contract upon a sufficient consideration. 
The plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to perform, and the de-
fendant's breach had interefered with the plaintiff's performance, to 
his damage. 
Acts of 1890, c. 418, §6, provides: 
All contracts made by any department of the city of Boston 
shall, when the amount involved is one thousand dollars or more 
... be in writing and no such contract shall be deemed to have 
been made or executed until the approval of the mayor of said 
city has been affixed thereto in writing. 
§18.21. 1342 Mass. 1$85,171$ N.E.2d 290 (1961). 
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Under the circumstances the mayor's signature of approval on the 
letter informing him of the trustees' desire to award the contract 
to the plaintiff and not on the contract itself could not be said to be a 
failure to comply with the statute. At all times it has been "affixed" 
to the contract by being stapled thereto. The statute requires no more. 
The mere acceptance of the lowest bid by the city does not constitute 
a contract. The statute does not require approval of an executed 
contract, it merely states that no contract shall be deemed to have been 
executed until it is approved. The plaintiff was, therefore, entitled 
to proceed with his case. 
§18.22. Police officer: Payment by private contractor. Some light 
is thrown upon the legal status of a police officer performing traffic 
duty for, and being paid by, a private contractor in the case of Yates v. 
City of Salem. l The case was an action of contract to recover city 
wages from October 18, 1959, to the date of the writ. The plaintiff 
on September 16, 1958, his "day off," was assigned to traffic duty for a 
contractor engaged in relocating the old Salem depot. He accepted 
the assignment and was paid by the contractor. He worked under the 
direction of the contractor, the state engineer, "and for the city 
marshal." While so working in uniform performing the work of a 
police officer he was struck by a motor vehicle "without fault of his 
own and was totally incapacitated." He was given a leave of absence 
with pay from September 17, 1958, until October 17, 1959, except for a 
short period. On October 17, 1959, his name was removed from the 
payroll and from October 18, 1959, he continued on leave without pay, 
although remaining totally incapacitated. The city's motion for a 
finding was allowed. The Supreme Judicial Court sustained the 
plaintiff's exceptions. The plaintiff was a public officer controlling 
vehicular traffic and was injured while in uniform and performing his 
work. He was not acting in the capacity of employee of the contractor. 
It was irrelevant to the issue of performance that he was paid by the 
contractor. There was error in finding for the defendant. The police 
officer, under G.L., c. 41, §llIF, was entitled to be paid for the period 
claimed. 
§18.23. School committee: Out-of·state travel. A case shedding 
more light on municipal liability for out-of-state travel expenses may 
be found in Day v. City of Newton.1 This case involved a petition 
under G.L., c. 71, §34, by taxpayers to require that an amount deleted 
from the school budget be provided together with 25 percent additional 
thereof. The Superior Court granted the relief sought, and the 
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. It appeared from the evidence that 
the board of aldermen deleted from the annual budget of the school 
committee $1100 of the $9500 requested for out-of-state travel and 
restricted the appropriation to the purposes of providing funds "for 
§18.22. 1342 Mass. 460, 174 N.E.2d 568(1961). 
§18.25. 1342 Mass. 568,174 N.E.2d 426 (1961). 
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recrUItmg teachers outside the state and sending members of the 
professional staff to meetings of national organizations and to con-
ferences of subject matter areas." This excluded an item to cover 
travel expenses of members of the school committee in January, 1959. 
The Court sustained the finding that these expenses for out-of-state 
travel were "necessary" expenditures under C.L., c. 71, §34. Within 
a wide limit, "necessary" means reasonably deemed by the committee 
to bear a relation to its statutory mandate. Further, C.L., c. 40, §5(34), 
does not vest in the appropriating body control over out-of-state travel 
by the school committee or its agents. However, an appropriating 
body may ferret out and exclude patently illegal items or sub items 
in any category of expenditure. 
§18.24. School committee: Dismissal of teacher. Another decision 
has recently come down from the Supreme Judicial Court relating to a 
school committee's right of dismissal, MacKenzie v. School Committee 
ot Ipswich. 1 This case was an appeal by the committee from a final 
decree in the Superior Court reversing the committee's vote of dis-
missal of the petitioner teacher under C.L., c. 71, §42. Section 43A 
of the chapter provides for an appeal to the Superior Court by a 
teacher dismissed under Section 42, the decision of the court to be final, 
"except as to matters of law." The petitioner at a special meeting 
of the school committee at which, among others, the superintendent of 
schools was present muttered an uncomplimentary remark to him, 
under the circumstances set forth in the opinion. The judge's finding 
that the teacher's utterance was improper and unbecoming conduct 
was plainly justified, if not in fact required. The judge, however, 
ruled that this was not, nevertheless, the conduct contemplated by the 
statute as a cause for dismissal, under the circumstances. The Supreme 
Judicial Court held this was error, absence of effect of the unbecoming 
conduct upon the pupils being irrelevant. Whether the teacher's act 
interfered with the efficiency of the school system had to be determined 
by the committee in context. 
The Court further held that errors of law in proceedings in the Su-
perior Court under C.L., c. 71, §43A, may not be brought to the Su-
preme Judicial Court by an appeal and that a writ of certiorari is the 
only available method of review. Since the issues had been fully 
argued, the Court ordered the appeal dismissed, without prejudice, 
however, to the timely filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari under 
C.L., c. 249, §4. 
§18.25. Referendum: Certification of signatures. Sharpe v. Regis-
trars at Voters at Northampton 1 adjudicated some important questions 
concerning the certification by registrars of voters of signatures upon 
referendum petitions. The Superior Court overruled demurrers and 
ordered that a writ of certiorari issue against the respondents to quash 
§18.24. 11961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 864, 174 N.E.2d 657. 
§18.25. 11961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 873,174 N.E.2d 648. 
15
Fisher: Chapter 18: State and Municipal Government
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1961
216 1961 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §18.26 
their certification of names on a referendum petition brought under 
G.L., c. 44, §8A, which statute had been accepted in Northampton. 
The appeals were dismissed and judgment was affirmed. 
The Court stated that the irregular procedure joining city coun-
cilors did not destroy the force of the petition for a writ of certiorari 
against the registrars, the only proper parties. The correct practice in 
proceedings of this kind is to hear arguments from one interested 
without making him a party.2 While not specifically stated in the 
statute governing municipal referenda, the Court held that the names 
on such referenda have to agree with those on the voting lists, as is 
specifically required for state-wide referenda. The exclusion by the 
trial court, however, of thirty-one signatures because "Mr." or "Mrs." 
was added was erroneous. The titles were surplusage and did not 
affect the signatures properly written. Moreover the addition of the 
thirty-one signatures to those found valid would not affect the result. 
§18.26. Referendum statute: Acceptance. Another case involving 
a municipal attempt to accept a local option statute was decided by 
Fisher v. City of Holyoke.1 A petition for a writ of mandamus was 
brought by the members of the fire department against the city, its 
mayor, city auditor, and city treasurer seeking an order requiring the 
respondents to take action to carry out the provisions of Acts of 1958, 
c. 621, which inserted Section 108D in G.L., c. 41, and provides for a 
minimum annual compensation of not less than $5000 for permanent 
fire fighters of cities and towns accepting the section. It further 
provides that the section shall become effective in cities not having a 
plan E charter "by vote of the city council subject to the provisions 
of the charter." The city charter is contained in Acts of 1896, c. 438. 
After an abortive attempt to accept Chapter 621 of the Acts of 1958, 
the board of aldermen again voted to accept it. The order passed a 
second reading and was presented to the mayor for his approval. The 
mayor returned it to the board without his approval and with a mes-
sage setting forth his reasons, after which the board passed the order 
over the mayor's veto. Thereafter the action of the board was made 
the subject of a referendum petition under G.L., c. 43, §§38, 42~ In a 
special election the vote was in the negative and against the acceptance. 
Acts of 1953, c. 343, entitled "An Act providing for the initiative and 
referendum for the City of Holyoke," was accepted by the voters of 
the city on November 3, 1953. The Court held that the provisions so 
accepted became a part of the Holyoke city charter and they fall 
within the phrase "subject to the provisions of the charter" contained 
in Acts of 1958, c. 621. The statutory phrase means all the provisions 
of the charter and not just some of them. General Laws, c. 43, §42, 
describes the referendum procedure upon the final passage of any 
measure, and G.L., c. 43, §37, defines "measure'" to include an ordinance 
or vote passed by a city council. The petition was therefore dismissed. 
2 Marcus v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 255 Mass. 5,150 N.E. 903 (1926). 
§18.26. 11961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 929,175 N.E.2d 393. 
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. §18.27. Dump: Nuisance. The case of Lenari v. Town of Kingston1 
arose from a bill in equity to enjoin the town from maintaining a 
dump so as to constitute a nuisance. From decrees overruling the 
plaintiff's exceptions to the master's report, confirmation of the report, 
and a final decree dismissing the bill of complaint, the plaintiff 
appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decrees. 
It appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff owned a cranberry 
bog with a building on it. The town acquired a parcel of land to the 
north of the plaintiff's. Prior to town ownership of this parcel the 
plaintiff had no difficulty concerning smoke, odor, dust, fires, rodents, 
Hies, or vermin. After the defendant acquired its land the town began 
the operation of a dump thereon. The dump was about 950 feet 
from the plaintiff's land. Since its location, the dump has spread in 
the direction of the plaintiff's land. At one point the dump is 100 
feet or less from the boundary line. The usual material is brought 
to the town dump. Intermittently tar paper and other inHammables 
were burned and made heavy dark smoke. Sewage at one time was 
permitted to How upon the plaintiff's land, causing damage. The 
Court held that smoke, odors, Hies, rodents, and wild dogs coming 
from the defendant's dump onto the property of the plaintiff may well 
constitute a nuisance. The case was remanded to the Superior Court 
for further findings relative to fires on the defendant's dump and other 
offensive conditions alleged to have existed on the plaintiff's property 
since the operation of the dump began. 
§18.28. Zoning: Open meetings law. The Open Meetings Law1 
was construed by the Supreme Judicial Court in the case of Elmer v. 
Board of Zoning Adjustment of Boston.2 The plaintiff, being ag-
grieved by a decision of the board, appealed to the Superior Court. 
This is the appeal of the board from the decree of the lower court 
that the decision of the board be annulled. The Supreme Judicial 
Court ordered a new decree that the decision of the board was not in 
excess of its authority and no modification was necessary. 
The vote of the board was not invalid because taken at an executive 
session following deliberations at executive sessions of which no notice 
had been given in compliance with G.L., c. 39, §23A. Chapter 437 of 
the Acts of 1960, inserting a new Section 23C in Chapter 39, requiring 
that notice of such open meetings be given, took effect as stated therein 
as of January 5, 1959, and the legality of the meeting of August 5, 1959, 
and earlier'meetings was to be determined thereunder. Section 23C 
in substance provides that upon proof of failure to comply with the 
various provisions requiring notice of open meetings and records of 
them, any justice of the Supreme Judicial or the Superior Court shall 
issue an appropriate order requiring the offending officer to comply 
therewith, ". . . but action otherwise duly taken at any meeting shall 
§18.27. 11961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 963,175 N.E.2d 384. 
§18.28. 1 G.L., c. 39, §23A. 
21961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1063, 176 N.E.2d 16. 
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not be invalidated by the failure . . . to carry out the said responsibil-
ities for public notice of meetings." Failure to give notice of the 
meetings of the board did not invalidate the action of the board. The 
Court further found that the action of the board, in changing two 
areas to different residence zones, was valid and of the kind which 
the Boston zoning statute permits. 
§18.29. Public works contract: Bidding. The petitioner in Chick's 
Construction Co. v. Wachusett Regional High School District School 
Committee1 appealed from an order dismissing its petition for a writ 
of certiorari. It had sought to quash the action of the committee in 
awarding a general contract to Granger for the construction of an 
addition to the Wachusett Regional High School and prayed that 
the contract be awarded to it. Granger was allowed to intervene. The 
order for dismissal of petition was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial 
Court. 
Granger's bid was the lowest, $907,700; Chick's was the next lowest, 
$907,785. Chick's contended that the Granger bid was invalid because 
there was an omission of an entry in the item relative to the cost of 
"rock excavation," violating that portion of G.L., c. 149, §44F, stating 
that every general bid that is on a form not completely filled in or 
which is incomplete, conditional, or obscure, or which contains any 
addition not called for, is invalid and the awarding authority shall 
reject every such general bid. 
Permitting Granger to intervene as a party respondent was irregular 
because only the members of the tribunal whose action is to be 
questioned were proper respondents. It was not improper, however, 
to hear argument from Granger as an interested private party, and all 
concerned in the case appear to have assented to the irregularity.2 
Under Massachusetts decisions rejection of the Granger bid would 
have been justified because on its face it did not comply with the 
requirements of the statute; on the other hand minor deviations from 
requirements will not require rejection of a bid. Moreover, a writ of 
certiorari will not be granted unless the petitioner demonstrates that 
substantial justice requires it even though defects of some compara-
tively inconsequential nature may appear on the record. 
The Court further stated that it did not appear that the dismissal 
of the petition was not in the exercise of the judge's sound discretion. 
Granger's bid was a complete bid for the complete work as specified. 
It was a bid to do the whole job at a fixed price. The lowest bidder 
had been awarded the contract. The public iriterests had not been 
adversely affected. 
§18.30. Trailer coach park: Licensing. The subject of municipal 
regulation of trailers and trailer coach parks arose in the case of 
Cliff v. Board of Health of Amesbury.1 The plaintiff filed an applica-
§18.29. 11961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1077, 175 N.E.2d 502. 
2 Marcus v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 255 Mass. 5, 8, 150 N.E. 903,905 (1926). 
§18.30. 11961 Mass. Adv. Sh. llOl, 175 N.E.2d 489. 
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tion with the defendant for a license to construct and operate a trailer 
coach park under G.L., c. 140, §§32B and 32H. The application was 
denied and the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court under Section 
32K of the chapter and further filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. 
The trial judge dismissed the appeal and sustained a demurrer to the 
petition for writ of certiorari. The action of the Superior Court was 
affirmed. 
The plaintiff submitted his plans to the state Department of Public 
Health, which were approved by it. The application was denied by 
the defendant because of an inadequate supply of water. Since a right 
of appeal from the decision of the defendants was provided by G.L., c. 
140, §32K, a petition for a writ of certiorari would not lie because 
such a writ only issues when no other adequate remedy is available. 
Trailers are subject to regulation under the police power. The 
board of health concluded that a health problem might be created if a 
license for a lOS-unit trailer coach park was issued in an area where 
some permanent residents of the town were not presently receiving an 
adequate supply of water. A refusal to grant a license in such 
circumstances was not arbitrary or capricious. General Laws, c. 140, 
§32H, does not require a local board of health to issue a license after 
approval by the state department. 
§18.31. Municipal corporations: Recall election. A municipal re-
call election in the town of Saugus was ordered in Donahue v. Select-
men of Saugus,! which was a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel 
the respondents to order a recall election with respect to three of its 
members. A single justice made findings and rulings and ordered 
the writ to issue subject to a determination of the full court of the 
rulings, and reserved and reported the case. 
Saugus has accepted a town manager form of government under 
Acts of 1947, c. 17, as amended. There is a five-man board of selectmen 
chosen for two-year terms. Holders of elective office other than town 
meeting members may be recalled in the manner provided upon the 
filing with the town clerk of an affidavit containing the name of the 
officer sought to be recalled and a statement of the grounds for recall. 
The "ground" stated was that the selectmen sought to be recalled voted 
to award an all-alcoholic beverage goods license detrimental to the best 
interests of the town. After the provisions of Chapter 17 had been 
complied with, the three selectmen sought to be recalled voted against 
an order for an election. In ordering the writ to issue, the Supreme 
Judicial Court said that "the recall election should be held on a 
Tuesday as soon as reasonably may be. The statutory requirement 
that the election be held not less than twenty-five nor more than 
thirty-five days after the date of the town clerk's certificate is in the 
circumstances directory as the single justice ruled." 2 
§18.32. Municipal corporations: Subdivision control and zoning. 
§18.!!1. 11961 Mass. Adv. Sh. II!!7, 176 N.E.2d !!4. 
21961 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1140, 176 N.E.2d at 37. 
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Zoning and subdivision control were before the Supreme Judicial 
Court in the cases of Doliner v. Planning Board of Millis1 and Doliner 
v. Town Clerk of Millis.2 The first case consisted of two appeals from 
action of the planning board of Millis under the subdivision control 
law.a Doliner alleged in each appeal that he as trustee owned land in 
Millis and that on April 8, 1959, he had applied for approval of a 
definitive subdivision plan. In one appeal DoHner alleged that on 
May 26, 1959, the planning board by letter informed him of the dis-
approval of the plan. In the other appeal DoHner alleged that the 
planning board had failed "to take any valid final action concerning 
'his subdivision plan' within sixty days following submission thereof 
as required by" G.L., c. 41, §81U. The trial judge found that on 
April 8, 1959, a month after a town meeting had adopted a new 
zoning by-law, DoHner filed with the planning board, and on April 9 
with the board of health, applications for approval of his plan. He 
notified the town clerk of his action. The board of health made no 
report on this plan within forty-five days thereafter. On May 26, 1959, 
the planning board notified the town clerk and DoHner that it had 
disapproved the plan because the lot sizes did not comply with the 
zoning by-law and map voted at the annual town meeting on March 
9, 1959. The planning board held no public hearihg prior to this 
disapproval. 
At the annual town meeting on March 9, 1959, the town voted to 
adopt the proposed zoning by-law and to repeal the existing one; the 
new by-law would be effective only if and when approved by the At-
torney General and when published.4 The new by-law was approved 
by the Attorney General on June 9, 1959. The trial judge further 
found that Doliner's plan was filed in accordance with the zoning 
regulations and by-laws in existence on April 8, 1959; that no valid 
action was taken by the planning board within sixty days after sub-
mission; that the amended zoning by-law did not control Doliner's 
plan; that the failure of the board of health to report within forty-five 
days was deemed approval of the plan; and that the failure of the 
planning board to approve or disapprove the plan within sixty days 
was deemed approval which became final on June 8, 1959. A final 
decree was entered that the plan was deemed approved by the planning 
board and board of health by reason of their failure to act within 
the time prescribed in G.L., c. 41, §81U, and that the lots shown on the 
plan conform to the residential use requirements of the zoning by-law 
in effect on June 8, 1959. The planning board appealed. After 
setting forth various provisions of the subdivision control law, the 
Supreme Judicial Court stated that at the time of the filing of Doliner's 
plan on April 8, 1959, and on May 26, 1959, when the planning board 
§18.32. 11961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1039,175 N.E.2d 919. 
21961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1049, 175 N.E.2d 925. 
:I G.L., c. 41, §§81K-81GG. 
4 Id., c. 40, §32. 
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notified him of its disapproval, none of the 1960 amendments to Sec-
tion 810 had taken effect. 
The disapproval of the planning board operated as such despite the 
failure by it to hold a public hearing as contemplated by the statute. 
The board's action not only gave Doliner the right to appeal under 
Section 81BB but also prevented approval through lapse of time with-
out action. After discussing G.L., c. 40A, §ll, the Court stated that in 
the sense that Section 11 and the new by-law would prevent issuing a 
valid building permit if the new by-law eventually became effective, 
it was "applicable" to Doliner's subdivision plan. If the planning 
board were to approve such a plan its action might be seriously 
misleading to a purchaser of the lot from Doliner. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, entering a new decree annul-
ling the decision of the planning board and remanding, directing the 
planning board to hold a public hearing upon Doliner's plan and to 
obtain the required action of the board of health, after which it is to 
take final action upon the plan in accordance with the applicable 
statutes, by-laws, and the opinion. 
The case of Doliner v. Town Clerk of Millis5 was a petition for a 
writ of mandamus to require the town clerk to expunge from the 
records of the town meeting held on March 9, 1959, a vote adopting 
the amendments of the town zoning by-law referred to in the previous 
case. Testimony was taken by a judge of the Superior Court, after 
which judgment for the respondent clerk was ordered. Upon appeal, 
the judgment was affirmed by the Court. 
In 1958, after a survey, a zoning scheme was prepared as an amend-
ment to the town's zoning by-law which provided for lots varying in 
size from 15,000 to 60,000 square feet, taking into account the location 
and other characteristics. After notice, a public hearing was held. 
After the hearing thirteen changes affecting some 4.3 percent of the 
total town acreage were included in the zoning plan. The principal 
proposal, as altered by the changes after the public hearing, was 
passed by the required two-thirds vote. The Court assumed that 
the petitioner had a standing to test the validity of the zoning by-law 
amendment in its application to his property. 
The changes made by the planning board after the public hearing 
did not render the revision invalid.6 The recorded written approval 
of the planning board under the circumstances was a sufficient recom-
mendation to the town meeting. 
The petitioner did not establish that the new zoning by-law was not 
reasonably related to the public health, morals, safety, and welfare. 
Moreover, every presumption was in its favor. The Court further held 
that, if the new zoning amendment did operate to forbid religious and 
educational structures in industrial districts, those provisions were 
clearly separable, and the possible constitutional issues would not 
Ii 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1049, 175 N.E.2d 925. 
6This aspect of the case was held to be governed by Burlington v. Dunn, 318 
Mass. 216, 218·219, 61 N.E.2d 243, 245 (1945). 
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invalidate the entire amendments. The Court did not reach the 
question as to whether the petitioner had standing to claim invalidity 
in this respect, lacking evidence that his land was adversely affected 
by the supposed prohibition. 
C. STATE GOVERNMENT: LEGISLATION 
§18.33. Voting rights: Registration limitations. One of the most 
important and far-reaching pieces of legislation enacted during the 
1961 session of the General Court was Chapter 118 of the Resolves. 
This chapter deals with a subject that is fundamental and basic to a 
democracy, voting. If a 65 percent turnout occurs at the polls, it is 
considered a good showing. The resolve is concerned with those 
people who want and do try to vote but cannot because of failure to 
meet various registration requirements. 
More specifically Chapter 118 is a resolve providing for an investiga-
tion and study by a special commission relative to protecting the 
eligibility of voters who have moved into or from the Commonwealth. 
The magnitude and importance of such legislation can only become 
evident when one is familiar with the requirements for voting in this 
state and country. The settlement and residence laws affect each 
prospective voter in a very real way. He may be required to reside 
in a state, county, and precinct a certain period of time before he can 
vote. 
The effect of residence laws on voting can be summarized simply by 
saying that a person cannot vote who has not complied with the 
statutory and constitutional residence requirements of the state 
wherein he seeks to cast his ballot. Thus a person may be precluded 
from voting in the state elections because he has not established 
himself in the particular community, or precinct within the com-
munity, for the prescribed length of time. Likewise a person is 
precluded from voting in the national elections by reason of his failure 
to establish a certain length of residence in a state prior to election 
day, despite the fact that he may be a United States citizen in good 
standing. 1 
The requirement of residence as a qualification for voting has been 
consistently upheld as a reasonable condition, the reason given being 
that only in this manner can voters be identified, fraud prevented, 
and the community assured of its members taking an active interest in 
government.2 Such regulations and requisites as the states impose have 
been upheld as valid by the Supreme Court of the United States as 
long as they do not deny or invade a right conferred by the federal 
Constitution. The requirement is well entrenched in American 
statutory law, virtually every state having made some provision for a 
period of residence as a prerequisite to the right to vote.s 
§18.lIlI. 1 U.S. Const., Art. I, §2; Art. II, §2; Amend. XVII, par. 1. 
229 C.J.S., Elections §19 (1941). 
S McCrary, Elections §52 (lid ed. 1887). 
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Generally, for the purposes of voting, "residence" means "domi-
cile." 4 Thus a man will be deemed a resident if he is present in the 
place and has the requisite intent to remain indefinitely.1> But 
mobility has long been a hallmark of America. Today our economy 
is geared to a mobile working force. That this is true is dramatically 
demonstrated by a few statistics. Since 1950, each year some five 
million Americans, more than 3 percent of our population, have 
changed residence from one state to another. By and large, egress and 
ingress of migrants from any particular state or community tend to 
cancel each other out.6 
Get-out-the-vote enthusiasts often belabor the average citizen for his 
lack of interest in his greatest political privilege: the exercise of his vote. 
The citizen, on the other hand, having completed his fall moving, 
may be quite eager to cast his ballot in his new community, only to 
find that he must come back next year or the year after. At least five 
million Americans were prevented from voting in the last national 
elections by residence laws similar to that of Massachusetts. 
The Massachusetts Constitution provides: 
Every citizen of twenty-one years of age and upwards . . . who 
shall have resided within the commonwealth one year, and within 
the town or district in which he may claim a right to vote, six 
calendar months next preceding any [state] election ... shall 
have a right to vote in such election . . .7 
No person, otherwise qualified to vote . . . shall, by reason of 
change of residence . . . be disqualified from voting . . . in the 
city or town from which he has removed his residence, until 
the expiration of six calendar months from the time of such 
removal.s 
The problem can become compounded when the issue is raised 
at registration time. To administer the laws as regards residency, 
towns set aside registration dates when one must qualify to vote. If a 
person does not register on these dates he cannot vote although he 
might in all other respects be eligible to vote. Another problem arises 
when a person is not a voting resident on the dates of registration but 
by the time election day arrives he would have been eligible. Can the 
town legally withhold his right to vote by refusing to register him? 
No answer has been provided by our courts to this problem, but it 
occurs frequently. 
The trend today is for courts to give less strict construction to 
4 Id. §63; Note, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 121 (1934). 
I> 28 C.J.S., Domicile §9 (1941). See also Holmes v. Greene, 4 Mete. 299 (Mass. 
1856); Op. Atty. Gen. Mass., June 2, 1941, p. 81. 
6 Goodwin, A Fluid Labor Force and Our Expanding Economy, in Residence 
Laws: Road Block to Human Welfare 8 (National Travelers Aid Assn. 1956). 
7 Mass. Const., Amend. Art. III. 
SId., Amend. Art. XXX. 
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residence requirements.9 It is conceivable that one day the Supreme 
Court of the United States will hold them unconstitutional as violative 
of the right to move freely.lO But until that time the individual states 
must themselves modernize their residency laws. The creation, by 
Chapter 118 of the Resolves of 1961, of a commission to study this 
problem represents a recognition of its seriousness by the General 
Court and a first step in modernizing Massachusetts law. 
9 Mandelaker, Exclusion and Removal Legislation, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 57,73. 
10 For an excellent discussion of the right, see Vestal, Freedom of Movement, 41 
Iowa L. Rev. 6 (1955). 
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